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Summary: Market freedoms resemble in many aspects fundamental 
rights. Since individuals can invoke them against the measures of 
Member States, they are subjective rights which restrict the compe-
tence of the Member States in favour of the individual. Besides this 
most apparent function, market freedoms are also about the distri-
bution of competence among Member States, and between Member 
States and the European Union. Market freedoms appear to confer the 
right to market access in the remaining area of their application. Thus, 
market freedoms seem to reserve an area of protection to the indivi-
dual, which is necessary for them to be deemed fundamental rights. 
This area, however, is only reserved in relation to the Member States. 
According to the incompetence approach which is presented here, Eu-
ropean institutions are bound by market freedoms only in an indirect 
way. It is just due to a lack of competence that a conflict between mar-
ket freedoms and measures of European institutions seldom conflict. 
Since market freedoms do not strive for comprehensive protection in 
relation to any bearer of state authority, they lack the decisive feature 
of fundamental rights. 
1. Introduction
Hobbes construed the state as an almighty Leviathan. Hobbes’s sta-
te is competent for everything. The liberal contribution to this simple 
state model is human rights.1 Human rights reserve a certain area for 
the competence of each and every individual. Not the Leviathan, but the 
individual is competent to decide whom to marry (art 23 ICCPR),2 whe-
re to settle (art 12 ICCPR), what to regard as the truth, or which god to 
worship (art 18 ICCPR). Human rights tell us about the distribution of 
competence between the individual on the one hand and state authority 
on the other. Human rights are silent with regard to the distribution of 
competence within state authority. No additional player will appear if we 
1 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European 
Community Law’ (1992) 3 (1) EJIL 7.
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, ente-
red into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 (ICCPR). 
*  Researcher and PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, FernUniversität in Hagen.
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distinguish between different bearers of state authority. A third player 
will not appear if a supranational organisation like the European Union 
joins the game. It does not matter what level of state authority is about to 
intrude into the area of competence reserved for the individual. Human 
or fundamental rights address state authority at any level. Human rights 
prohibit, for instance, torture (art 7 ICCPR), no matter if it is applied at 
the local, regional or national level (art 50 ICCPR). And states are in-
dubitably not allowed to do away with the prohibition of torture just by 
founding a supranational bearer of state authority as is the case with 
the European Union. Thus, supranational organisations are part of state 
authority, and not a third party.
When it comes to market freedoms, there are more players than just 
state authority and the individual. Without doubt, the European Union 
is one of these actors. In the application of the free movement of goods, 
for example, one must distinguish between the country of origin and the 
country of destination. So, among state authority, there are at least three 
actors. Unlike fundamental rights, market freedoms differentiate betwe-
en the bearers of state authority. It will be shown that the free movement 
of goods, for instance, is to a significant extent nothing more than a rule 
on distributing competence among the Member States. And it is doubtful 
if the remainder that can be assigned as competence to the individual 
deserves to be called fundamental rights.
Market freedoms can be interpreted as fundamental or human rights 
within the constitutional framework of the economic constitution of the 
European Union, ie the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The Court repeatedly suggested such a legal nature, especially 
of the free movement of persons in its case law. The Court spoke of art 
45 TFEU as granting the ‘fundamental right of persons to move freely 
within the [Union]’ in the El-Yassini case.3 Or it stated that access to em-
ployment is ‘a fundamental right’ conferred individually on each worker 
by this article.4 
The Court even went beyond this terminological proximity in the Ru-
tili judgment by comparing the limitations to free movement under art 45 
TFEU with those to freedoms under the European Convention on Human 
Rights with regard to proportionality and the intangibility of the essence 
of a protected right.5
Admittedly, market freedoms resemble in many respects fundamen-
tal rights.6 Since individuals can invoke them against the measures of 
3 Case C-416/96 El-Yassini [1999] ECR I-1209 para 45.
4 Case 222/86 Unectef v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, para 14.
5 Case 36/75 Rutili v. Ministre de l’intérieur [1975] ECR 1219, para 32.
6 Thorsten Kingreen in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert, EUV/EGV, Das Verfas-
sungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta (3rd edn Verlag CH 
Beck, Munich 2007), art 28-30 EC, recitals 66-68.
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Member States, they are subjective rights which restrict the competence 
of the Member States in favour of the individual. Besides this frequent 
function, when market freedoms are dealt with, market freedoms rather 
concern the distribution of competence among Member States, and 
between Member States and the European Union. 
The competence conceded to the individual is not necessarily an 
exclusive competence. Most human rights have limitations, ie the state 
may intrude into the area of protection if this is justified. In the language 
of competence, competence is shared between state authority and the 
individual, whereupon the delineation is carried out by means of admi-
ssible justification7 and the principle of proportionality. Individuals are, 
for instance, competent to decide what to write in a children’s book. The 
State, however, may interfere in the individual’s choice for the protection 
of minors, but only if this obeys the principle of proportionality (cf art 10 
ECHR).8 We will see that to a significant extent market freedoms do not 
even offer an area of protection, and so we do not arrive at justification 
and proportionality (section 2).
Market freedoms appear to confer a right to market access in the 
remaining area of application. In this way, market freedoms seem to re-
serve an area of protection for the individual, which is necessary for them 
to be deemed fundamental rights. This area, however, is only reserved in 
relation to Member States. The European institutions are bound by the 
market freedoms only in an indirect way. It is just due to the lack of com-
petence that market freedoms and the measures of European institutions 
seldom conflict (section 3). 
2. Distribution of competence within state authority 
The free movement of goods has always been the pioneer market 
freedom for the development of case law and doctrine. The free movement 
of goods comprises a customs union (art 30 TFEU) and a prohibition 
of quantitative trade restrictions, including measures having equivalent 
effect (art 34-37 TFEU). The customs union mostly goes unnoticed when 
it comes to the free movement of goods. The same is true for quantitative 
restrictions. Customs duties and quantitative restrictions are effectively 
abolished within the internal market. Therefore, the discussion focuses 
on measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions, and 
there particularly on restrictions on imports. The ECJ has recently cla-
rified how to scrutinise measures having an effect equivalent to the qu-
7 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’ (March 2007) University of Oxford 
Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 14/2007 9.
8 Handyside v United Kingdom (App no 5493/72) ECHR 1976.
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antitative restriction on imports in some preliminary observations on the 
two-wheeler trailer decision.9 
2.1 Dassonville 
According to the Dassonville formulation, which was coined in the 
eponymous judgment,10 ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States 
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potenti-
ally, intra-[European] trade are to be considered as measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions’.11 For that reason, they are 
prohibited under art 35 TFEU.12 This definition covers two prohibitions: 
a prohibition on discrimination and one on restriction. Prohibition on 
discrimination means that Member States must not treat imported pro-
ducts less favourably than domestic ones.13 The prohibition on restriction 
addresses measures which hinder the access of products originating in 
other Member States to the market of a Member State without being dis-
criminatory.14 The most important group within these measures can be 
encapsulated by the key term ‘dual regulatory burden’. 
2.2 Cassis de Dijon
These measures hamper intra-European trade because of the rela-
ted diverging legal and technical requirements within the internal mar-
ket.15 Legal approximation can relieve producers who want to export their 
products to another Member State of the dual regulatory burden. If there 
is no harmonisation, the restriction test can serve the same purpose. The 
Member State where an imported product is to be sold may only impose 
such restrictions on goods lawfully manufactured in another Member 
State which are necessary to fulfil mandatory requirements.16 This is the 
key finding of the Cassis de Dijon judgment17 which is certainly one of the 
most influential ECJ decisions.18 
9 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519, paras 33-7.
10 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
11 Dassonville (n 10) para 5.
12 Commission v Italy (n 9)  para 33.
13 Commission v Italy (n 9) para 37.
14 Tamara Perišin, ‘Sloboda kretanja roba i njezine implikacije naregulatornu autonomiju 
u Republici Hrvatskoj’ (2007) 44 Politička misao, 17, 21.
15 Perišin (n 14) 24.
16 Commission v Italy  (n 9) para 35.
17 Case 120/78 Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.
18 Derrick Wyatt, ‘Trade, Tax and Takeovers: Can the European Court De-Regulate Europe 
Despite Resistance From the Council and Parliament?’ (2005) 1 Croatian Yearbook of Euro-
pean Law and Policy 95, 95.
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The ECJ established the restriction test in this milestone decision.19 
A German supermarket chain was not allowed to sell French Cassis de Di-
jon liqueur in Germany because the blackcurrant liqueur contained less 
alcohol than prescribed by German law in order to be marketed as liqueur. 
The Court held that the free movement of goods only allows national le-
gislation to impose restrictions on goods lawfully produced in another 
Member States that are necessary to fulfil mandatory requirements. The 
Cassis de Dijon judgment can be misunderstood as granting something 
like a right to deregulation or liberty from unnecessary regulation.
Actually, the Cassis de Dijon judgment is about the distribution of 
competence in the first place. It contributes to the broader idea that wit-
hin the internal market it is sufficient if a product complies with one set 
of rules, and in the case of Cassis de Dijon, with the rule of the coun-
try of origin. The judgment did not say that product-related regulation 
needs to be justified. In fact, the rules on minimum alcoholic strength 
of the country of origin (France) were not questioned at all. The Cassis 
de Dijon judgment is only about additional rules imposed by the country 
of destination. Such rules are not prohibited, but they must prove to be 
necessary.
These additional rules may constitute obstacles and require justifi-
cation. In principle, it is enough that goods comply with the rules of the 
country of origin. The country of destination may even impose additional 
restrictions if it is justified by the written grounds of justification in art 
36 TFEU or if they are necessary in order to fulfil the mandatory requ-
irements in the public interest. These additional restrictions are meant 
when the court rules that:
obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence 
of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they 
are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requ-
irements to be met by such goods constitute measures of equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions even if those rules apply to all pro-
ducts alike.20 
Products only enjoy the principle of mutual recognition if they are 
‘lawfully manufactured and marketed’.21 However, if the product does not 
comply with the rules that are in force in its country of origin, the country 
of destination is competent to set the product requirements. These rules 
cannot be tested if they are justified and necessary under the Cassis de 
Dijon doctrine. Products must comply with one set of rules. If they do not 
19 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649.
20 Commission v Italy (n 9) para 35.
21 Commission v Italy (n 9) para 35.
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comply with those of the country of origin, they must obey the law at the 
point of sale whether it is ‘necessary’ or not. 
Besides the restriction test, the discrimination test also serves the 
principle that it is enough if a product complies with one set of rules. The 
discrimination test ensures that the Member State competent for regula-
ting the respective product does not impose additional rules in compari-
son with a product which is not part of intra-European trade. The coun-
try of origin may impose more severe restrictions on products intended 
for exportation only if this is justified under art 36 TFEU. So, in principle, 
a product needs only comply with the rules of the country of origin, and 
the discrimination test sees to it that the rules of the country of origin are 
the same as the rules that apply to goods for the domestic market. Only 
additional rules are ‘obstacles’ which call for justification.
2.3 Reverse discrimination
One rather odd feature of the restriction test of the free movement 
of goods is that the Member States may apparently discriminate against 
their own nationals.22 Usually, it is the other way round: some funda-
mental rights are restricted to the citizens of the respective state. They 
could be called citizens’ rights or civil rights in contrast to human rights 
which strive for universal application. The right to asylum is a counte-
rexample of a human right restricted to non-citizens.
While foreign producers can choose if they want to comply with the 
rules of the country of production or with those of the country of sale, 
domestic producers have no choice. They must obey their domestic law 
no matter how unnecessary it may seem and how disadvantageous it is 
for their competitiveness in comparison with imported goods.
Reverse discrimination is a clear consequence of the rule governing 
the distribution of competence between different bearers of state autho-
rity: it is enough if you comply with one set of rules, either that of the 
country of production or that of the country of sale. Since both are one 
and the same, producers intending to sell their product on the domestic 
market have no choice. They must conform to domestic law.
2.4 Keck
The very broad field of application of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine 
is limited by the Keck23 judgment.24 In accordance with this jurisdiction, 
certain selling arrangements are excluded from the prohibition of restric-
22 Claus Dieter Classen in Thomas Oppermann, Claus Dieter Classen & Martin Nettes-
heim, Europarecht (4th edn Verlag CH Beck, Munich 2009) § 23, recital 16.
23 Case C-267/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
24 Perišin (n 14) 24.
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tion (they may still be scrutinised under the discrimination test). Exam-
ples of certain selling arrangements are the prohibition to open shops on 
Sundays,25 the sale of certain goods to be reserved for licensed retailers,26 
the availability of baby milk only at chemist shops27 and the requirement 
to observe a minimum profit margin for sales28. 
With regard to certain selling arrangements, there is no principle 
of mutual recognition. It is not enough that a product complies with the 
selling arrangements of the country of origin; the rules on the destination 
market must be obeyed even if they are stricter than those on the market 
of origin. French liqueur, for instance, must not be sold in Germany on 
Sundays, because of Germany’s laws on trading hours that ‘observe the 
Sabbath’,29 (art 40 Basic Law in connection with art 139 Weimar Consti-
tution), although French shops may open on Sundays. Nevertheless, the 
idea that it is sufficient to comply with one set of rules is upheld. What is 
particular for selling arrangements is that there is no choice about which 
rules to obey. The selling of goods may be exclusively regulated by the 
Member State where they are sold. In the language of the competence 
approach, the competence for selling arrangements is attributed to the 
country of destination—first of all for practical reasons. A distribution 
of competence for regulation in accordance with the principle of mutual 
recognition would be unfeasible when it comes to selling arrangements. 
Just imagine German stores selling French liqueur on Sundays while all 
domestic goods cannot be sold.
If the country of sale has exclusive competence for certain selling 
arrangements, it follows as a matter of pure counterbalancing that the 
country of production must have exclusive competence for certain ‘pro-
duction arrangements’ on the same footing.30 There are, indeed, rules 
regarding the production conditions where it would be impractical if they 
depended on the market for which the product is produced. Labour con-
25 Case C-69/93 Punto Casa and PPV [1994] ECR I-2355, para 12; Case C-418/93 Seme-
raro Casa Uno and others v Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco and others [1996] ECR I-2975, 
para 12; trading hours of filling stations: Case C-401/92 Criminal proceedings against 
Tankstation ‘t Heukske and Boermans [1994] ECR I-2199, para 12; earlier judgments on 
Sunday selling without recourse to certain selling arrangements: Case 145/88 Torfaen Bo-
rough Council v B & Q PLC [1989] ECR 3851, para 14; Case C-169/91 Council of the City of 
Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B & Q Plc [1992] ECR I-6635, para 12.
26  Case C-387/93 Pretore di Genova v Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663; Case C-162/97 Crimi-
nal proceedings against Nilsson and others [1998] ECR I-7477.
27 Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1621.
28 Case C-63/94 Belgapom v ITM and Vocarex [1995] ECR I-2467.
29 Bible, Exodus 20:8; Deueronomy 5:12.
30 Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘Wettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten oder Wettbewerb der Hersteller? 
Plädoyer für eine Neubestimmung des Art. 34 EGV’(1995) 159 Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 78, 87.
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ditions and environmental legislation can serve as examples.31 Employers 
must not pay wages below legally defined national minimum wages or 
contrary to applicable industrial agreements just because the product 
goes to a low-wage country where such wages would be admissible. Fac-
tories must comply with their national environmental legislation: they 
must not switch off their pollutant filter just because production is in-
tended for export to a country where factories are not required to have 
such filters. 
Although the effect on competitiveness caused by a mismatch in 
production conditions is more obvious than that of certain selling arran-
gements, production conditions as a hindrance to intra-European trade 
have not attracted much attention in connection with the free movement 
of goods. National environmental protection measures or minimum wages 
are not challenged as measures having an effect equivalent to export re-
strictions (art 35 TFEU), although they weaken competitiveness and in 
this way harm the chances for the product on foreign markets. 
It is settled law that there is no restriction test for measures having 
an effect equivalent to export restrictions.32 It is generally accepted that 
the country of production is competent to regulate production conditi-
ons—at least when it comes to minimum conditions. 
2.5 Overlapping competence for product-related regulation
As we have noted, the country of production may set production 
arrangements, and the country of sale the selling arrangements. Com-
petence, however, is not necessarily exclusive if the selling or production 
arrangement becomes product related. There is concurring competence 
for product-related arrangements. Countries of sale and of production 
may set requirements, but they do not accumulate with the effect that 
the product must comply with both set of rules. It is sufficient if a pro-
duct is compatible with one set of product-related rules. So the importer 
can choose between them. 
31 Roth (n 30) 87.
32 Case 15/79 Groenveld [1979] ECR 3409, para 7; Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993, 
para 15; Case 286/81 Oosthoek [1982] ECR 4575, para 13; Case 172/82 Fabricants raffi-
neurs d’huile de graissage v Inter-Huiles [1983] ECR 555, para 12; Case 237/82 Jongeneel 
Kaas [1984] ECR 483, para 22; Case C-412/97 ED [1999] ECR I-3845, para 10; Case 
C-12/02 Grilli [2003] ECR I- 11585, para 41; Case C-3/91 Exportur [1992] ECR I-5529, 
para 21; Case C-293/02 Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation [2005] ECR I-9543, para 
71; Case C-205/07 Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter [2008] ECR I-9947, para 40; Anthony 
Arnull and others, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2006) recital 16-027; Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four 
Freedoms (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2007) 132; Classen (n 22) § 23, recital 39; Andreas Ha-
ratsch, Christian Koenig & Matthias Pechstein, Europarecht (7th edn Mohr Siebeck, Tübin-
gen 2010) recital 787; Tamara Perišin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits of Regulatory 
Autonomy in the EU and WTO (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 26.
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The country of sale may therefore regulate trading hours, because 
they do not relate to products. These rules are exempted from the re-
striction test as ‘certain selling arrangements’ under the Keck judgment. 
However, the situation is different if the selling arrangements of the co-
untry of production affect the sale in another country. Dutch law may 
allow sales packaging that is prohibited as deceptive in Germany. The 
Dutch producer of a chocolate bar feels a dual regulatory burden, becau-
se the producer must design the sales packaging not only in accordance 
with Dutch law, but he must also comply with the law of the country 
where the chocolate bar is to be sold.33 Thus, accepting both countries 
as competent for regulating the sales packaging would hinder intra-Eu-
ropean trade. 
These so-called product-related selling arrangements fall within the 
scope of the restriction test of the free movement of goods. If the choco-
late bar already complies with the rules in force in the country of origin, 
additional restrictions may only be imposed by the country of sale if this 
is covered by the written grounds of justification of art 36 TFEU or if it 
is necessary in order to fulfil the mandatory requirements in the public 
interest.
The opposite situation does not attract as much attention. The co-
untry of production may, of course, regulate production conditions. This 
competence is non-concurring insofar as the requirements are not pro-
duct related. Nobody seriously proposes that one may go below minimum 
wages or switch off pollutant filters just because goods are being produ-
ced for export. Product-related requirements for production are only dis-
cussed as a possible obstacle for imports. They attract as much attention 
as non-product-related processes and production methods, especially at 
the WTO level, when states close their markets for products manufactu-
red under conditions regarded as inadequate at the point of sale.34 So, 
the focus is on restrictions on imports in the international context, whe-
reas production requirements as obstacles for exports need to be discu-
ssed here. 
Rules such as those about the minimum alcoholic strength of a 
liqueur can concern sales (liqueur may only be sold if it has a certain 
alcohol content), as well as production (liqueur may only be produced 
with a certain alcoholic strength). In the second case, the question arises 
about whether production must be allowed if the product (eg liqueur) is to 
be exported to a country whose rules are observed. However, the analogy 
33 Case C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln v Mars [1995] ECR 
I-1923, para 13.
34 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, DS21/R 
(3 September 1991) unadopted, BISD 39S/155, para 5.15; Perišin (n 14) 137.
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to selling arrangements suggests the opposite: taking the case law serio-
usly, there is no restriction test for measures having an effect equivalent 
to import restrictions, which means that regulating production belongs to 
the non-concurring competence of the country of production, even if the 
regulation is product related. 
For the competence approach, the only thing that matters is that 
there is a distribution of competence. The free movement of goods is only 
relevant as far as additional rules are concerned. The country of produc-
tion may only impose more severe rules for production for goods intended 
for export than for goods that are to stay in the country if this is covered 
by the written grounds of justification of art 36 TFEU. The country of de-
stination must accept the production conditions in the country of origin, 
even if they are product related. Additional requirements imposed by the 
country of sale are admissible if this is justified by the grounds of art 36 
TFEU or if they are mandatory requirements in the public interest.
2.6 The European Union
The European legislator can simplify the situation just by passing 
harmonisation measures. So, if you ever plan to sell crème de cassis 
made in accordance with your sole recipe, it might be a good idea to look 
first at Regulation (EC) No 110/2008.35 You can learn in No 34 of its Ap-
pendix II that crème de cassis is a blackcurrant liqueur with a minimum 
sugar content of 400 grams per litre and a minimum alcoholic strength 
of 15%.36 Obviously, there is European legislation that would very likely 
conflict with the free movement of goods if it were enacted at the national 
level. 
How is it possible for the European legislator to fix a minimum level 
of alcoholic strength for blackcurrant liqueur? What is it about the ar-
gumentation of the Court in its Cassis de Dijon judgment that provides 
that it is not necessary to fix a minimum alcoholic strength for liqueur 
in order to safeguard the fairness of commercial transaction, because ‘it 
is a simple matter to ensure that suitable information is conveyed to the 
purchaser by requiring the display … of the alcohol content on the pac-
king of products’?37
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protec-
tion of geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) no 
1576/89 [2008] OJ 2008 L39/16.
36 The denomination ‘Cassis de Dijon’ is, according to Appendix III of Regulation (EC) No 
110/2008, reserved for crème de cassis from France. 
37 Case 120/78 Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, para 
13.
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One could certainly argue that European legislation is not as severe-
ly scrutinised as national legislation or that a broader margin of discreti-
on is conceded to the European legislator than to the national legislator. 
A coherent argument for this correct observation is difficult to find. In 
the end, the Court found a breach of the principle of proportionality in 
the quoted passage, a principle to which the European legislator is also 
committed in accordance with art 5 (4) TEU. So, if intra-European trade 
must not be hampered by unnecessary national regulation, why should 
apparently equally unnecessary legislation from a European source be 
allowed?
If there is harmonisation, it suffices that the product complies with 
it. So, once again, it is enough that the product complies with one set of 
rules. The European minimum rule for alcoholic strength is not tested as 
a second set of rules as was the case with the German legislation in the 
Cassis de Dijon case. European regulation is the first set of rules, as in 
the French minimum rule for alcoholic strength in the Cassis de Dijon 
case. However, a second set of rules must prove that it is necessary to 
deviate from the general distribution of competence, since it is only a 
second or additional set of rules that can hamper intra-European trade. 
With regard to the free movement of goods, the necessity of the first 
set of rules is not questioned at all. Today, any liqueur producer must 
accept the European rule for minimum alcoholic strength, just as REWE 
(the plaintiff in the Cassis de Dijon case) had to accept the French rules. 
Neither could REWE have sold Cassis de Dijon with less alcohol than 
allowed in France at that time, nor may anyone today sell crème de cassis 
that does not comply with Regulation (EC) No 110/2008. With regard to 
the free movement of goods, it is wholly irrelevant how much alcohol the 
first set of rules requires, or if it is necessary to ban under-alcoholised 
liqueurs from the market. 
3. The individual
The previous sections have shown that to a significant extent the 
free movement of goods is primarily about the distribution of competence 
amongst state authority. One can easily gain the impression that there is 
no area conceded to the individual’s competence. Apparently, the indivi-
dual cannot decide about what should be in crème de cassis. The market 
may not export or import or produce whatever it wants. Until now, the 
free movement of goods only decides who may set the rules. The first set 
of rules, however, was not tested at all by the yardstick of the free move-
ment of goods in the discussed cases. 
The first set of rules, however, might be tested for compliance with 
superior legal sources. A national rule, for instance, can be unconstituti-
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onal. And so can European law if it conflicts with primary European law. 
And this is precisely the point where the individual might come into play. 
3.1 Safeguarding the functioning of the market
One superior source of law is the TFEU with its market freedoms. 
The first set of rules was not tested on compliance with market freedoms, 
because there was obviously no infringement. Production, shipping or 
selling arrangements can, however, hamper intra-European law, and not 
only if they diverge within the internal market as is the case with a dual 
regulatory burden. 
3.1.1 Market access as subject of protection
The above point is especially true where the functioning of the mar-
ket is concerned. Markets work notably well according to the theory of 
perfect competition if it is easy to enter and leave a market, if there are 
consequently many actors on the supply and demand side, if there is 
perfect information, if the products are homogenous, and if transaction 
costs are low.38 Although it seems at first sight that harmonisation con-
cerns uniformity of supply, market freedoms and legal harmonisation are 
rather about market access. There may be other tools in European law 
that take care of the other aspects of a functioning market—a sufficient 
number of suppliers is, for instance, one task of competition law—but 
market freedoms are about keeping down the costs of market entry. 
3.1.2 Market transparency (‘perfect information’)
Market transparency is discussed as a prerequisite for a functioning 
market that could be safeguarded by market freedoms. A functioning 
market requires that the demand side knows what is offered on the mar-
ket. Commercial communication is therefore essential for a functioning 
market. For this reason, regulation of advertising belongs to the parti-
cular cases of selling arrangements which—unlike most selling arrange-
ments—are actually capable of hindering intra-European trade in accor-
dance with the Dassonville formulation,39 just because they render the 
market less effective.
Nonetheless, the ECJ has steadily decided that even these particular 
selling arrangements are only tested under the discrimination test.40 Alt-
hough rules limiting market transparency may constitute restrictions to 
38 Maher Dabbah, EC and UK Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge 2004) 4.
39 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para 5; Case C-292/92 Hünermund and others 
v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-6787, para 21; Case C-34/95 
Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini and TV-Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, para 43; Commi-
ssion v Italy (n 9) para 33.
40 Hünermund (n 39) para 21; Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519 ¶ 28.
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market access, they are only governed by the principle that it is enough 
to stick to one set of rules, in the case of selling arrangements to those in 
force at the point of sale. These rules must be the same for domestic and 
imported products. Restrictions of market transparency comply with the 
free movement of goods if they restrict market entry in the same way for 
domestic and for imported products.41 So, market transparency as such 
is not a subject of protection for the free movement of goods. 
Hence, the nearly total ban of tobacco advertisements by Directi-
ve 2003/33/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising 
and sponsorship of tobacco products42 (Tobacco Advertising Directive) 
complies with the free movement of goods, although it severely limits 
the chances of market entry for products not already present on a given 
market.43 Since market entry is equally difficult for domestic and forei-
gn newcomers, it is not discriminatory and is thus compatible with the 
internal market and the free movement of goods. As the Court held for a 
nearly complete ban of advertising for a certain product at the national 
level, to wit the restrictive Swedish rules on advertising for alcoholic be-
verages: 
[P]rovisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements 
are not liable to hinder intra-[European] trade, so long as they apply 
to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and 
so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the 
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member 
States.44 
3.1.3 Homogeneity of supply
The tobacco market is also illustrative of a functioning market in 
another aspect: the homogeneity of supply. Directive 2001/37/EC on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of 
the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale 
of tobacco products45 requires different packaging for every single Mem-
ber State. Cigarette packets allowed in one Member State must not be 
41 Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795, para 15; Commission 
v Italy (n 9) para 36.
42 Directive (EC) 2003/33 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrati-
ve provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco 
products [2003] OJ 2003 L152/16.
43 Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573, para 15.
44 Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795, para 15; Commission 
v Italy (n 9) para 36.
45 Directive (EC) 2001/37 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrati-
ve provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of 
tobacco products [2001] OJ 2001 L 194/26.
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sold in another country in accordance with art 5 of Directive 2001/37/
EC, because the health warnings have to be in the relevant combination 
of official languages of the respective Member State. There is only one 
exemption: the same packaging can be used for Austria and Germany,46 
because they are the only two Member States with the same combination 
of official languages.47 If uniformity of supply were a concern of market 
freedoms, the directive could not legally be based on art 114 TFEU (then 
art 95 EC, cf first recital to the preamble of Directive 2001/37/EC). 
Rules that do not require specific packaging for every single Member 
State—ie that do not require diverging supply—would be more conduci-
ve to the functioning of the internal market. Nonetheless, the ECJ has 
repeatedly endorsed Directive 2001/37/EC as compatible with the inter-
nal market, thus with the free movement of goods (cf art 26 (2) TFEU).48 
If there were no European legislation, it would be quite obvious that a 
single Member State—ie France—would have to accept cigarette packets 
from another Member State (Belgium, Luxembourg) if they bore health 
warnings in France’s official language, even if they were accompanied by 
health warnings in other languages (German, Dutch, Luxembourgish). 
3.1.4 Summary
Even where the functioning of a market as such is concerned, as in 
the case of homogeneity of supply, the free movement of goods confers 
competence on a specific bearer of authority. There is no question of re-
serving this for the individual. Market freedoms safeguard market access. 
They do not concern other aspects of a functioning market, like homoge-
neity of supply or a sufficient number of suppliers. The regulative core of 
market freedoms can be boiled down to the right to market access. 
46 There are even three countries with German as the only official language if you count 
Liechtenstein where the directive is in force because of the EEA Agreement (Decision of the 
EEA Joint Committee No 10/2003 [2003] OJ 2003 L94/91). 
47 The only languages with official status in more than one Member State are English, 
French, German, Greek, Swedish and Dutch. English, for instance, is the only official lan-
guage in the United Kingdom. Irish and Maltese apply in Ireland and Malta. French, Dutch 
and German are official languages in Belgium, so the language combination differs from the 
neighbouring countries of France, the Netherlands and Germany, where only one of these 
languages is official. The linguistic situation in Luxembourg differs from the Belgian one, 
because Luxembourgish substitutes Dutch as the third official language there. Swedish is 
the official language in Sweden and Finland, but it shares its status with Finnish only in 
the former. The same is true of Greek, because Turkish is co-official in Cyprus while Greek 
is the only official language in Greece. 
48 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] 
ECR I-11453, para 193; Case C-434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, para 70; Case 
C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, para 78.
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3.2 Right to enter a market 
Market freedoms might be equated with the right to market access. 
This could grant individuals the right to decide where to offer their pro-
ducts. Such a right, however, does not reach far. There might be the free-
dom to enter a market, but there is no right that there will be a market. 
Member States may deny drugs, pornography,49 lotteries,50 and abortion 
access to the market, although the product may be lawful in another 
Member State. 
Indeed, market freedoms prohibit Member States from restricting 
existing national markets to national suppliers. Member States must 
not exclude foreign supply (and also foreign demand) from their national 
markets. Market freedoms, however, do not require Member States to 
create a market for a certain product. If Italy does not want motor cycles 
with trailers on its streets, the free movement of goods does not force it 
to allow such trailers and to enable foreign trailer producers to sell them 
to Italian bikers.51 If we compare the free movement of goods to the right 
to vote, for instance, this would be the right to vote without the right to 
elections. 
Although abortion is regarded as a service in the meaning of art 
56 TFEU,52 the freedom to provide services does not confer the right to 
anyone to interrupt pregnancies in Ireland. The European legislator may, 
however, create a market for a certain service in accordance with art 59 
(1) TFEU. The European legislator uses art 114 TFEU to open other mar-
kets. Directive 2002/24/EC53 has, for instance, created a market for light 
quadric-cycles (art 1 (3) Directive 2002/24/EC), which had not until then 
been admitted to road traffic in, for instance, Germany. 
It is not always simple to say if a certain rule prohibits the market as 
such or just restricts an existing market for certain products. The rule on 
the minimum alcohol content of liqueur can serve as an example. If there 
is no duty to create a market for every product (for instance drugs, lotte-
ries or abortions), why should national legislation not be allowed to close 
the market for liqueur with little alcohol? What is the difference between 
the admissible prohibition of trailers for motorcycles and the inadmissi-
ble prohibition of liqueur with little alcohol? The decisive difference is not 
that the former is a prohibition of use, but that the latter prohibits the 
49 Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795, para 22.
50 Case C-275/92 HM Customs and Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, para 62.
51 Commission v Italy (n 9).
52 Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan and others 
[1991] I-4685, para 21.
53 Directive (EC) 2002/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2002 
relating to the type-approval of two or three-wheel motor vehicles and repealing Council 
Directive 92/61/EEC [2002] OJ 2002 L124/1.
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sale of a product. The ban of sale is the more severe intervention. The-
refore, it could be expected that prohibiting the sale of a product rather 
than just its use in road traffic would be incompatible with the free mo-
vement of goods. 
Since market freedoms make no claim for a certain market to be cre-
ated, but a right to be admitted to a market when there is such a market, 
the decisive point is whether there is already a market in place. Tools of 
competition law can help to determine if there is a market and if a cer-
tain product belongs to it. We can test if a product belongs to an already 
existing market by demarking the relevant market. If a product that be-
longs to a market is not admitted to it, market freedoms can help. If the 
product does not belong to an already existing market, market freedoms 
do not require that that market be created. Competition law uses the re-
levant market concept for delimiting markets.54 Two products belong to 
the same market if they address the same demand, ie if the demand for 
one product can in principle also be satisfied by the other product. 
Cassis de Dijon with an alcoholic strength of 15% had to be admitted 
to the German market because this liqueur addressed the same demand 
as alcoholic beverages already present on that market. In contrast, abor-
tion need not be legalised in Ireland because there is no service present 
in Ireland that could serve as a substitute for the demand for the medical 
termination of pregnancy. 
3.3 Market freedoms and European legislation
The litmus test, however, is whether or not this right to market acce-
ss, the liberty to enter a market, reserves an area of competence for the 
individual, even vis-à-vis the European legislator. If there were a funda-
mental right to market access, any bearer of authority would have to be 
committed. In the language of the competence approach, market free-
doms would not reserve competence for an individual if it was already the 
exclusive competence of the European legislator. If individuals shared 
their competence with the European legislator, this would also be com-
patible with the idea of market freedoms being fundamental rights. This 
would be the case if the European legislator had to prove the necessity of 
legislation under the yardstick of proportionality. 
There is seemingly little room for doubt that European institutions 
are bound by market freedoms. The ECJ has repeatedly stressed the 
54 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law [1997] OJ 372/5); Haratsch, Koenig and Pechstein (n 34) recital 1094; Cla-
ssen (n 22) § 21, recital 13; Arnull (n 32) recital 24-004.
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commitment of European institutions to market freedoms.55 Doctrine 
endorses in general this commitment,56 but concedes a certain margin 
of discretion to the European legislator.57 This diverging level of commi-
tment is incompatible with the idea of fundamental rights. The problem, 
however, is the lack of a clear line of argumentation for a reduced level 
of commitment. If market freedoms are applicable to Member States and 
the European Union itself, it needs to be explained why both are not com-
mitted in the same way. 
The Member States are committed to market freedoms because of 
the supremacy of European law.58 When we look at the areas of Union 
competence, nothing hints at the supremacy of internal market policy 
over other policies with regard to the European Union itself. Beside trans-
European networks, fisheries and other more or less important fields 
of Union activity, the internal market appears in a long list of principal 
areas of shared competence in art 4 (2) TFEU. In contrast, art 7 TFEU 
stresses the equality of all areas of Union competence.
3.3.1 The beyond powers approach
The thesis to be tested is that the European Union is not directly 
committed to market freedoms, but it cannot infringe on them within its 
competence. If true, this would show why the commitment of the Member 
States to market freedoms differs from that of the European Union: their 
diverging commitments are simply based on different foundations. The 
European Union is not bound by the codified market freedoms themsel-
ves, but it simply cannot infringe on them within its competence.
3.3.2 The areas of Union competence
Some competence norms for the European Union serve the idea that 
if the internal market does not function without the harmonisation of na-
55 Case 80/77 Les Commissionnaires Réunis and Les Fils de Henri Ramel [1978] ECR 927, 
para 35; Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland [1984] ECR 2171, para 15; Case 37/82 Rewe-Zen-
trale [1984] ECR 1229, para 18; Case C-51/93 Meyhui v Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke [1994] 
ECR I-3879, para 11; Case C-114/96 Kieffer and Thill [1997] ECR I-3629, para 27; Case 
C-434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, para 57; Case C-154/04 Alliance for Natural 
Health and others [2005] ECR I-6451, para 47.
56 Petersmann (n 1) 1.
57 Heinrich Matthies, ‘Die Verfassung des Gemeinsamen Marktes’ in Roland Bieber (ed), Das 
Europa der zweiten Generation (festschrift for Christoph Sasse) (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
Baden-Baden 1981) 127; Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘The European Economic Community’s Law 
on Services: Harmonization’ (1988) 25 CML Rev 35, 76; René Barents, ‘The Unity of the 
Common Market. Some Reflections on the Economic Constitution of the Community’ (1990) 
33 German Yearbook of International Law 9, 21; Rolf-Oliver Schwemer, Die Bindung des Ge-
meinschaftsgesetzgebers an die Grundfreiheiten (Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main 1995) 37 and 
209; Torsten Körber, Grundfreiheiten und Privatrecht (Mohr Siebeck Tübingen 2004) 88.
58 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Arnull (n 32) recital 5-008.
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tional legal systems, the European Union may facilitate the functioning 
of the internal market by approximation or through harmonisation mea-
sures. Competence norms of this type do not allow infringement on mar-
ket freedoms. They only empower the promotion of market freedoms. The 
most prominent competence of this kind is art 114 TFEU, general com-
petence for the approximation of laws in the internal market.59 Others 
are connected to a single market freedom, to wit arts 46, 53, 56 and 59 
TFEU.60
However, the European Union may also pass legislation which is not 
directly connected to the internal market and market freedoms. There 
are a lot of other competences. A conflict with market freedoms can occur 
here, because Union competence is not directly tied to market freedoms, 
for the competence norms have objectives other than promoting the in-
ternal market. The problem can be reduced to the question of whether or 
not the European Union can act in these non-economic areas of Union 
competence in conflict with market freedoms. 
3.3.3 Possible competence conflicts
A conflict between market freedoms and some other policies is hardly 
imaginable. It seems, for instance, rather difficult to infringe on the free 
movement of a worker by means of the development co-operation com-
petence of art 209 (1) TFEU. Other competence norms, however, appear 
more dangerous to market freedoms. Consumer protection, for example, 
has often been engaged by Member States to justify obstacles to the free 
movement of goods and other market freedoms.61 Another equally dange-
rous competence is environment protection (art 11 TFEU) with its com-
petence norm of Article 192 TFEU. If these competence norms allowed 
measures regulating the internal market, the European legislator could 
pass legislation in conflict with market freedoms. 
The ECJ had the chance to decide in such a conflict on the occasi-
on of the Titanium Dioxide Directive (89/428/EEC).62 The Council had 
issued this directive under the competence of environment protection 
measures (now art 192 (1) TFEU). The directive prohibited the titanium 
dioxide industry from introducing its toxic waste into the sea. Its purpose 
59 Isidora Maletić, ‘The Boundaries of the Internal Market after the Lisbon Treaty: A Closer 
Look at Article 95 EC’ (2009) 5 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 19, 20.
60 Schwemer (n 57) 35.
61 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649, para 9; Case 407/85 Drei Glocken and others v USL Centro-Sud and others [1988] 
ECR 4233, para 15; Case  178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227, para 14; Case 
C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln v Mars [1995] ECR I-1923, 
para 7.
62 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR [1991] I-2867.
19CYELP 6 [2010] 1-21
was to bring to an end competition distortion by ecological dumping wit-
hin the European titanium dioxide market. 
The ECJ decided that the European legislator could not pass this 
directive on the basis of environment protection competence. According 
to art 11 TFEU, environment protection must always be observed. Envi-
ronment protection is therefore one of the most general objectives of the 
European Union. According to its wording, art 192 (1) TFEU only allows 
legislation for the realisations of one aim (art 191 TFEU, environment 
protection), whereas measures taken by the European legislator under, 
for instance, art 114 TFEU must serve first the internal market objecti-
ve and second, because of the cross-section clause of art 11 TFEU, the 
objective of environment protection.63 The Community legislator must not 
adopt a measure on the basis of non-market competence if the effect on 
the internal market is more than merely incidental.64 The legislator is 
forced to use competence norms made for the fulfilment of the internal 
market, but these competence norms only allow measures to be adopted 
that are compatible with market freedoms.
Art 114 TFEU is therefore more specific than art 192 (1) TFEU, be-
cause the former requires two objectives to be taken into account, where-
as the latter just one.65 Accordingly, the more specific one has to be taken 
due to the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali,66 which means that 
if two regulations at the same level are applicable in the same situation, 
the more specific one prevails.67 If the more general one prevailed, no field 
of application would remain for the more specific rule, whereas, the other 
way round, the more general rule will still have its field of application 
where the specific one is not pertinent. 
The ECJ sets out that a measure which affects the internal market 
as well as environment protection must not be taken using art 192 (1) 
TFEU if the measure ‘is conducive to the attainment of the internal mar-
ket and thus falls within the scope of [art 114 TFEU] a provision which is 
particularly appropriate to the attainment of the internal market.’68 The 
Court further clarified its jurisdiction in the waste shipment case: art 114 
TFEU must be taken if the internal market is ‘affected’ by the measure 
in question.69 It is only inapplicable if the effect on the internal market is 
63 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR [1991] I-2867, para 8.
64 Tamara K Hervey, ‘Up in Smoke? Community (Anti)-Tobacco Law and Policy’ (2001) 26 
ELR 101, 120.
65 Commission v Council (n 63) para 8.
66 Haratsch, Koenig and Pechstein (n 32), recital 371.
67 Matthias Pechstein, ‘EG-Umweltrechtskompetenzen und nationale Alleingänge beim 
Umweltschutz’ (1996) 18 Juristische Ausbildung 176, 178.
68 Commission v Council (n 63) para 23.
69 Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR, I-939, para 19.
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only ‘incidental’.70 As a conclusion, article 114 TFEU must be used if the 
effect on the internal market is more than just incidental. Since art 114 
TFEU may only be used for promoting the internal market, the European 
legislator may only pass legislation with effect on the internal market if 
this effect is positive. The European legislator lacks the competence to 
erect hindrances to the internal market. The jurisdiction can be tran-
sferred to other policies. In fact, before the waste shipment case, the ECJ 
had already established the same rule for the relationship between art 
114 TFEU and the health protection competence of art 31 (2) EA in its 
Chernobyl II judgment.71 
3.3.4 Implications for European legislation
According to the beyond powers approach, the European legislator 
seems to be committed to market freedoms, but in a different way from 
the Member States. The European legislator is committed to market free-
doms because the legislator has competence only for legislation directly 
regulating the internal market if this legislation is conducive for its atta-
inment. Legislation with only an incidental effect on the internal market 
can however be passed without observing market freedoms. Neverthele-
ss, the European legislator is bound by the general prohibition of discri-
mination referred to in art 18 TFEU in such a case. 
Although commitment to the market freedoms of the Member Sta-
tes and the European Union differ with regard to their legal basis, the 
commitment itself is quite alike. European legislation directly affecting 
the internal market will usually be comparable to what is addressed by 
the restriction test of the market freedoms. Discriminatory measures are 
explicitly prohibited by art 18 TFEU. European legislation with only an 
incidental effect on the internal market serves objectives that would be 
deemed mandatory requirements if they were invoked by Member Sta-
tes. The principle of proportionality, which must be observed when ju-
stifying national measures on grounds of mandatory requirements, must 
be obeyed by European legislation because of art 5 (4) TEU. The major 
difference is that national measures must prove that they are necessary, 
even though they intrude into the area of the protection of market free-
dom, whereas European measures do not specifically need to prove their 
necessity with regard to market freedoms. 
70 Commission v Council (n 69) para 19; referring to the Chernobyl II case: Case 70/88 
Parliament v Council [1991] ECR I-4529, para 18.
71  Case 70/88 Parliament v Council [1991] ECR I-4529, para 17.
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4. Conclusion
The beyond powers approach can explain the commitment of the 
European institutions to market freedoms without referring to the legal 
basis that commits the Member States. This causes slight differences in 
the extent of commitment. While the measures of the Member States can 
really conflict with the subjective right of an individual granted by mar-
ket freedoms, a conflict of European measures with market freedoms is 
rather a question of coherence among the different areas of Union compe-
tence. The initial thesis is apparently true: there is no area of competence 
conceded to the individual. What seems to be the area of protection of a 
fundamental right to market access is only protected against intrusions 
by one branch of state authority, to wit the Member States. Although it is 
difficult for the European institutions to actually break market freedoms, 
it is due to their own lack of competence rather than because competence 
here would be reserved for the individual. 
The difference for the practical application of European law might be 
marginal. However, this is only true for the moment. The difference will 
become highly visible as soon as the European Union acquires competen-
ces which do not so easily step back in favour of art 114 TFEU—that is, 
just because the internal market is affected.
